ABSTRACT: This study examines whether internal audit frequency, functionally separating internal auditors' (IAs) dual role as providers of both assurance and consulting affect (1) IAs' perceptions of the likelihood management opportunistically manipulates earnings and (2) the likelihood IAs report evidence of these reporting choices. I also examine whether organizational identification affects IAs' reporting choices. Participants are 188 practicing internal auditors. Related to the first research question, I predict and find that IAs perceive earnings manipulation to be least likely when the internal audit function (IA function) both employs continuous auditing (CA) and functionally aligns its roles. I also find that CA potentially mitigates the effect of a less objective internal audit function and that this effect is most pronounced in consideration of real relative to accruals-based earnings management. Related to the second research question, I find that separating the dual role increases the likelihood of reporting. Like the perceived likelihood of occurrence, I also find that these effects are most pronounced when the IA function uses CA and functionally separates its roles and that IAs are more likely to report real earnings management relative to accruals-based earnings management. Lastly, contrary to my expectations but consistent with prior research, I find that IAs who identify more with their company are especially more likely to report real relative to accruals-based earnings management. This study has implications for auditors, managers, accounting researchers, and standards setters.
Introduction
find that the likelihood management opportunistically manipulates earnings is lower when the internal audit (IA) function uses continuous auditing (CA). This finding complements prior research which suggests that one of the many benefits of CA is an increase in audit quality (Chiu et al., 2014) . However, no prior research examines whether and to what extent CA affects the judgements and decision making of internal auditors and managers. While some prior research suggests that internal audit assurance activities improve financial reporting quality by reducing earnings manipulation (e.g., Prawitt et al., 2009) , it is unclear whether this occurs because the IA function helps to improve internal controls or because high quality internal audits facilitate the assurance provided by external auditors on the financial statements (DeFond and Zhang, 2014; Donovan et al., 2014) . Some critics argue that a lack of objectivity by internal auditors reduces assurance quality and diminishes their ability to influence financial reporting quality. Accordingly, I extend Davidson et al. (2013) by examining 1) how CA affects the likelihood that management will opportunistically manipulate earnings, 2) whether internal auditors are more or less likely to report identified incidences of earnings manipulation, and 3) whether the type of earnings manipulation moderates these relationships.
Examining the effects of CA and internal auditor objectivity on auditors' and managers' decisions is important for at least two reasons. First, DeFond and Zhang (2014) suggests that audit quality helps to improve financial reporting quality and that audit quality is a function of both the supply from accounting firms and the demand from management. In this study, I focus on one demand-side factor-the perceived quality of the IA function. The IA function can add value to the organization by helping management to improve the control environment and risk management which both have implications for financial reporting (Carcello et al., 2017a) . Threats to internal auditors' independence and objectivity such as providing both assurance and consulting services in the same area of the company could weaken the value added to management's competency (Brandon 2010) . Second, perceived lack of independence and or objectivity contributes to less reliance on the IA function during the annual financial statement audit (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013) .
However, reliance increases when the IA function uses CA and internal controls are deemed adequate (Malaescu and Sutton, 2015) and is no different whether the IA function is in-house versus outsourced (Davidson et al., 2013) .
In this study, I first examine whether the IA function's use of CA indeed improves assurance quality. I expect management to be less likely to engage in opportunistic earnings manipulation when the IA function uses continuous relative to periodic auditing and that functionally separating the assurance and consulting activities within the IA function improves assurance quality. Further, I expect that functional separation is more important when the IA function uses periodic auditing. I secondly examine whether internal auditors will be more likely to report identified incidences of opportunistic earnings manipulation when the IA function uses CA and functionally separates its roles. I also expect that internal auditors' identification with their employer will further moderate this relationship. On the one hand, social identity theory suggests a positive relationship between identification with a specific group (e.g., your employer) and protection of that group (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Mael and Ashforth, 1992; Thompson, 1995) .
One demonstration of protection could be IAs' acceptance of personally-harmful activities, such as opportunistic earnings manipulation that could sacrifice long-term firm value, as sensible if those activities could improve the short-term well-being of the company (Staw, 1985) . While this reasoning holds in an external audit setting, practicing IAs perceive stronger identity with the company as a strength that enables them to have a greater influence on management behavior and to confidently express intolerance of pressure to acquiesce to management's reporting preferences (Stefaniak et al., 2012) . Lastly, while prior research suggests management considers and shows preferences for accounting versus real activities earnings manipulation (Graham et al., 2005) , it is unclear how those choices manifest in the current setting and how IAs respond to the consequences of either choice. As a result, I explore but make no predictions about differences in these options.
I conducted a 2x2x2 between-subjects experiment that manipulated IA assurance frequency (continuous versus periodic), IA objectivity (separate versus combined assurance and consulting functions) and earnings manipulation type (accrual-based versus real earnings management). Additionally, I measure organizational identity. Participants were 188 practicing IAs identified through professional affiliation with chief audit executives, local chapters of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the Association of College and University Auditors.
Participants have on average 12.27 years of IA experience and represent staff, management, and chief audit executives. Participants read a case about an impending financial reporting decision at mid-year for the divisional vice president of a manufacturing company. The primary dependent measures were participants' assessment of 1) the likelihood that the division vice president would manipulate earnings to achieve an annual bonus and 2) the likelihood the auditor would report identified incidences of earnings manipulation.
Related to the likelihood of occurrence, I find that IAs perceive earnings manipulation to be least likely when the IA function uses CA and functionally segregates its roles. The results for the main effect of CA hold across earnings manipulation type. However, I find that what drives the main effect of functional segregation of roles is a lower likelihood (no difference in the likelihood) of accruals-based (real) earnings management. Related to the likelihood of reporting, I find that IAs are more likely to report identified incidences of earnings manipulation when the IA function uses CA and when roles are functionally segregated. The overall results also signal differences in the likelihood of reporting by type of earnings manipulation such that IAs are more likely to report real earnings management relative to accruals-based earnings management. I also examine whether IAs who identify more with the company are more likely to report incidences of earnings manipulation. Contrary to my expectations, I find that IAs who identify more with the company are less likely to report these incidences. This overall result is driven by a significantly lower likelihood of not reporting in the accruals setting compared to a statistically insignificant but directionally consistent higher likelihood of reporting in the real earnings management setting.
This finding related to accruals is consistent with suggestions in prior auditing research that accruals-based earnings management is more of a focus in the external audit (e.g., Commerford et al., 2016; Greneir et al., 2017; Kim and Park, 2014) . When I include controls for whether participants have prior external audit experience, for example, I find more support for this assertion. Collectively, these results suggest that CA can improve the quality of assurance provided by the IA function and that in certain settings IA objectivity can have differing effects on the judgements and decisions of both management and auditors.
These results are important for several reasons. First, this study is one of the first to examine the effect of CA on IAs' judgments and decisions and factors that could improve those decisions.
While the prior literature demonstrates audit efficiencies gained by infusing technology such as CA into assurance activities (Chiu et al., 2014; Donovan et al., 2014) , a dearth of research exists on the behavioral implications of CA (Brown-Liburd et al., 2015) . Use of CA necessarily increases the monitoring frequency of management's choices, which has been shown to reduce opportunism and increase ethicality (e.g., Merchant and Rockness 1994) and auditor competence in a particular area or industry. Findings of this study suggest that use of CA has important deterrence effects that could improve both internal controls and IA quality. Second, in its dual role as provider of both assurance and consulting, involvement of the IA function in the development of CA technology could present independence concerns when the IA function uses the tools they developed in assurance activities (IIA 2009a) . This study suggests assigning auditors to assurance tasks related to the financial statements with higher organizational identification and prior external audit experience could mitigate these concerns. Finally, the participants in this study have significant internal audit experience and represent a cross-section of industries, which uniquely qualifies them to assess the implications of innovations in IA practice and how those innovations may affect not only IAs but also management behavior (e.g., as in Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley 2002) . My study complements contemporaneous research that finds that IAs, especially chief audit executives and more experience auditors, provide assessments of management behavior in response to internal audit assurance that is relatively similar to managers in their companies (Carcello et al., 2017a, b) .
These studies provide an avenue for obtaining participants to spur more research on management and internal audit (Defond and Zhang, 2014) .
In the remainder of this paper, I review the prior literature and develop hypotheses. I then provide a summary of the methodology, discuss results, and offer concluding remarks.
Literature and hypotheses

Continuous auditing as a signal of audit quality
In this study, I focus on the enhancement of audit efficiency and effectiveness which could lead to higher audit quality when the IA function uses CA relative to periodic auditing (PA). I focus on the IA function because investments in a high quality IA function can assist management in better assessing and improving risk within the company (Carcello et al., 2017a) and thereby increasing management's competence about the company. This increased competence is also an important demand-side factor related to improvements in (external) audit quality (DeFond and Zhang, 2014) .
The output provided by CA tools serve as additional audit evidence that can support conclusions rather than as evidence which forms the basis for reports provided to management. In addition, CA tools permit auditors to allocate more effort to higher-order tasks. For example, if the IA function is able to test 100% revenue transactions for a given cycle to test the operating efficiency of a particular control, the auditor could focus on all or a sample of the exceptions that could lead to identifying systematic control problems rather than extrapolating from a sample of transactions alone. This approach could also serve as a dual-purpose test as it could also serve as a substantive test of transactions. Many CA tools allow such audit testing and the benefits could lead to both a higher quality audit and increased value added to management. Prior research on internal auditing suggests that higher quality IAFs indeed reduce management opportunism (Prawitt et al., 2009 ) and material internal control weaknesses (Lin et al., 2011 Liburd 2017) they should become more competent in that area and be better able to detect opportunism in that area. DeAngelo (1981b) suggests that audit quality comprises the joint probability that an auditor will express increased competence by discovering a breach in the accounting system and by reporting that breach. Accordingly, if as in H1a, the use of CA is perceived as increasing audit quality, I expect that use of CA will also increase the likelihood that incidences of earnings manipulation will be reported. Ceteris paribus,
H1b
: Internal Auditors will be more likely to report incidences of earnings manipulation when the IA function uses continuous auditing relative to periodic auditing.
Implications of internal auditors' dual role as providers of assurance and consulting
In the current study, I build on prior research by investigating the dual role of IAs as providers of both assurance and consulting services to their company. Consistent with prior research, I expect that functionally aligning the IA function such that IAs conduct either assurance or consulting activities results in greater objectivity and thus lowers the likelihood of opportunistic financial reporting by management because auditors will be more likely to report these incidences of opportunism (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004) . The IA setting presents a unique situation in that both managers and IA standards setters suggest that this dual role adds value to the company in the areas of corporate governance, risk management, and internal control (IIA 2009a). However, serving in this dual role could present threats to auditor objectivity. Independence and objectivity are related constructs. However, independence is an organizational attribute that eludes IAs because they work for the same company they audit. Alternatively, objectivity, as required by IIA
Standards (2017), is an individual attribute required of and achievable through factors such as the reporting line and organizational structure of the IA function and its leadership. Threats to objectivity include social pressure threats from management not to report findings; economic interest threats if incentive compensation or other benefits are received from the company; or selfreview threats when an IA reviews his or her own work (Church and Schneider, 1992; Gramling et al., 2004; Stewart and Subramaniam 2010) . In an audit setting, separating these roles allows IAs to focus on a specific role as well as to approach that role more objectively, which could mitigate the social pressure threat. I hold compensation constant to isolate other these other threats to objectivity. Further, factors such as the size, industry, certifications, and management preferences affect the amount of operational versus financial assurance the IA function performs as well as the division of its assurance, consulting, and other activities among its professionals (Anderson et al., 2012) . One of the advantages the IA function has over the external auditor, for example, is a more robust institutional knowledge of the company. Consequently, IAs may be better equipped to generate their own expectations about management's operational decisions and be more likely to identify these instances, but a lack of objectivity results when the auditor fails to report a material error, if he or she identified the error (DeAngelo 1981a). This suggests the following hypothesis.
Ceteris paribus,
H2a
: Internal Auditors will assess the likelihood that a manager engages in earnings manipulation as less likely when the IA function has separate versus combined assurance and consulting roles.
H2b
: Internal auditors will be more likely to report incidences of earnings manipulation when the IA function has separate versus combined assurance and consulting roles.
2.3. The joint effects of assurance frequency and functionally segregating the IA's dual roles 2.3.1. The effect on the likelihood of management opportunism
In H1, I predict that IAs will perceive earnings manipulation to be least likely when the IA function uses continuous rather than periodic auditing. I expect this main effect even when the IA function combines its dual roles. However, I expect as H2 signifies, this effect will be magnified when the IA function clearly segregates its roles. The joint effects of audit frequency and separating the IAs' dual roles in this study extend and provide a more comprehensive test of the DeAngelo (1981a DeAngelo ( , 1981b definition of audit quality in an internal audit setting. This intuition suggests that the perceived likelihood of earnings manipulation will be lowest when the IA function uses CA and segregates its roles.
H3a
: Internal Auditors will assess the likelihood that a manager engages in earnings manipulation as least likely when the IA function uses continuous auditing and functionally separates its roles.
The effect on the likelihood of auditor reporting
I also examine whether differences in this intuition affect the likelihood of reporting by the internal auditor. To arrive at these predictions, I consider the expectations in H1b and H2a. IAs are more familiar with a firm's operations because they perform more assurance engagements focused on operations. As a result, I expect differences in ability to identify and willingness to report incidences of opportunism. H1b examines whether the frequency of assurance affects the likelihood of reporting management opportunism when it exists, while H2a suggests IAs will be more likely to report opportunism when roles are segregated. Collectively, this suggests that IAs will be more likely to report earnings manipulation when the IA function uses CA and segregates its roles.
H3b
: Internal Auditors will be more likely to report incidences of earnings manipulation when the IA function uses continuous auditing and functionally separates its roles.
2.4. Organizational identification and auditor reporting 2.4.1. Social identity theory as a framework
As discussed in Section 2.2, objectivity of the IA function and its professionals is important.
However, it is unlikely that at some level IAs develop no identify with the company that employ them and for which they provide any number of services designed to help improve internal controls, operations, financial reporting, and other functions. Prior auditing research suggests that IAs' identification with the company precludes them from making objective judgments about management and about how likely they are to report any audit findings (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013) .
Within companies, the IA function can be perceived as a group but the extent that identification of professionals within the IA function extend to the company is the focus of this study. protectionist strategy rather than one of acquiescence to management preferences. It is important to note, however, that sound corporate governance and sufficient organizational status within the company are antecedents that permit IAs to provide objective and value-added feedback to management and other stakeholders rather than focusing on the threat of termination.
H4:
Internal Auditors with higher levels of organizational identification will be more likely to report identified incidences of earnings manipulation.
Research method
In this study, I elicit practicing IAs' assessments of the likelihood that managers would manipulate earnings to achieve a specific earnings target, which, if met, would result in those managers receiving an annual bonus. Participants also indicate whether they would report identified incidences of these opportunistic choices. Participants' decisions related to the likelihood of earnings manipulation and the likelihood they would report are collected independently and the sequencing is counterbalanced to mitigate order effects. report") and 1 ("Yes, I would report"). Lastly, participants complete a post-experimental questionnaire that includes demographic and other classifying questions based on theory and prior research (see Table 1 ). with alerts when real-time transactions violate the pre-established controls. It also highlights the fact that senior management will receive more timely reports from the IA function. In the periodic auditing condition, the hypothetical IA function reviews the same information. There is a more significant delay, however, in relaying any exceptions noted to senior management. I also indicate that the previous audit of the division was the previous day (year), and there were no significant findings to ensure that participants anchor decisions on the frequency of audits.
I manipulate the auditor's dual role (IADual) at two levels between subjects, [separate] vs.
(combined) consulting and assurance functions, and operationalize it as follows:
Your internal audit department has [separate] (combined) assurance functions (e.g., audits) and consulting functions (e.g., special projects like developing new software).
I operationalize the dual roles as a separation between consulting and assurance functions to address one of the primary differences between internal and external auditors. While all management teams represent the IA function, separating the two potential roles of the IA (Ahlawat and Lowe 2004; Plumlee 1985) addresses the potential for economic bonding-resulting in a lack of objectivity (Lin and Tepalagul 2012 review this literature).
I also manipulate earnings manipulation type (Type) at two levels between subjects, accrualsbased vs. real earnings management, and operationalize it as follows:
To increase the division's budgeted annualized income, the manager could [reduce bad debt expense] (cut advertising expenditures) for the second half of FY15.
Related to accruals, the case further indicates that reducing the allowance percentage from 50 percent to 25 percent for uncollectible accounts for accounts over 90 days due will significantly decrease the bad debt expense (focusing on an accounting estimate). However, collection patterns for prior years are inconclusive as support for a reduction in the allowance percentage. Related to REM, the case further indicates that cutting advertising expenditures will result in a reduction of product costs (focusing on the direct cash flow implications). With these lower costs, and sales trending as indicated by the senior cost accountant, divisional income from operations could be closer to the target and the division could save cash (Roychowdhury, 2006) . While either option presents the manager with a viable option to reach the bonus target, both equally make the decision-making process more complex and demonstrates the amount of judgment inherent in these decisions (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2010 ). where lower scores on the Org_ID scale suggest IAs may be more objective.
Participants
Practicing IAs received an electronic link to the study and were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions. Two hundred fifteen (215) IAs accessed the instrument online through Qualtrics. However, I exclude 15 who indicated they were members of the IIA but had not practiced within the past 5 years (e.g., retired or educators); one who failed the IADual manipulation check; four who failed the IAFreq manipulation check; and 7 who failed both manipulation checks. 6 As noted in Panels A and B of Table 2 provide support for H3a (t = -6.22, p < .001).
The experiment also manipulates whether participants differentially assess the likelihood of accruals-based (AEM) versus real earnings management (REM) [Type] . I make no ex ante predictions related to Type but re-examine H1a, H2a, and H3a by earnings manipulation type to determine if the overall pattern of results hold across Type. I provide cell means in Panel A of Table 2 and plots of means for AEM in Figure 1 and REM in Figure 2 . These results suggest that even when the IA function is relatively less objective due to combined assurance and consulting roles, use of CA could lead to less REM. Despite the insignificant interaction, planned contrast tests in Panel C of Table 2 also support H3a (t = -3.50, p = .001).
[ Table 3 suggest that using CA increases the likelihood of reporting in Model A (z = 1.96, p = .050). Related to H2b, Panel B of Table 3 shows a main effect IADual in the no controls model [Model A (z = 1.91, p = .056). These findings hold after controlling only for Certified (untabulated) or EA_Experience (untabulated). H3b examines whether IAs are more likely to report instances of earnings manipulation when the IA function both uses CA and has separate assurance and consulting roles. Panel C of Table 3 suggests the IAFreq x IADual interaction is insignificant overall, but untabulated planned contrasts lend some support for H3b (t = 1.58, p = .117). The overall results notwithstanding, a main effect for Type in Model A (z = -5.04, p < .001) suggests differences in reporting by earnings manipulation setting.
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] I also make no ex ante predictions for but re-examine H1b, H2b, and H3b by earnings manipulation type to determine if the overall pattern of results hold. Related to AEM, model AEM A in Panel B of Table 3 shows an insignificant main effect for IAFreq (H1b), IADual (H2b) and an insignificant IAFreq x IADual interaction even after controlling for either Certified (untabulated) or EA_Experience (untabulated) which are both significant predictors at p <.001.
Untabulated planned contrasts suggest that IAs are more likely to report AEM when the IA function uses CA and has separate assurance and consulting functions, but the difference is insignificant (p > .100). These results provide no support for H1b, H2b, or H3b. What appears to drive the overall results is the REM setting. Specifically, model REM A in Panel B of Table 3 shows a positive and significant main effect for IAFreq (H1b) (z = 2.26, p = .021) and IADual (H2b) (z = 1.96, p = .049). Also, consistent with the overall results, I find an insignificant IAFreq x IADual interaction. These findings hold after controlling for either Certified (untabulated) or
EA_Experience (untabulated). Untabulated planned contrasts support for H3b (t = 2.59, p = .012).
[ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 4.3. The moderating effect of organizational identification on the likelihood of reporting
Recall that H4 examines whether IAs who identify more with the company (high Org_ID)
are more likely to report incidences of earnings manipulation. To test this assertion, I include a binary measure of the Org_ID score in the models discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. In the overall results, the relationship between Org_ID and the likelihood of reporting is negative suggesting that the more IAs identify with the company, the less they are likely to report earnings manipulation.
This relationship is moderately significant in Model C which also controls for whether IAs hold at least one certification (z = -1.68, p = .093). This pattern of means and the Model C result provide no support for H4. However, an examination of the results by earnings manipulation type provide some explanation for the overall results. While statistically insignificant, the relationship between
Org_ID and the likelihood of reporting REM is positive in all model specification (REM A, B, and C) in Panel B of Table 3 . What appears to drive the overall significance is a negative and statistically significant relationship between Org_ID and the likelihood of reporting AEM across models AEM A which includes only Org_ID (z = -1.92, p = .054), AEM B which adds Certified (z = -2.47, p = .014), and AEM C which adds EA_Experience (z = -2.00, p = .045). While the results fail to support H4, they do suggest that IAs who identify more with the company and are either certified or have external audit experience may be less likely to report AEM because they perceive it to be a focus of the external audit (e.g., Commerford et al., 2016; Kim and Park, 2014) .
Additional analyses
To explore whether demographic factors explain my primary results, I examine the effects of each factor collected (other than prior employment and certification discussed in sections 4.1.
4.2, and 4.3) on both the perceived likelihood of earnings manipulation and the likelihood of reporting earnings manipulation. Interestingly, I find that when I parse the data by participants' self-reported position (e.g., staff auditor through chief audit executive), as participants ascend the ranks in the IA function, they assess the likelihood of earnings manipulation as less likely (untabulated) but the likelihood of reporting remains unchanged (untabulated) . No other demographic factors provided additional explanatory power for the primary results.
Conclusion
In this study, my findings contribute to prior research and examine whether the frequency of analyses, that provide benefits similar to CA. This study provides contexts in which reliance on or leveraging the work of the IA function could result in subsequent external audit efficiencies (e.g., Malaescu and Sutton 2015; Davidson et al. 2013 ) and assist in the necessary evolution of auditing standards (Vasarhelyi, Alles, and Williams 2010) and project initiatives (Zhang et al. 2012) designed to address the aforementioned limitations on the external auditor. This study also complements contemporaneous research which suggests IAs may be a sufficient proxy to gain insights about not only IA but also management behavior.
My study has limitations that are typical of experimental studies. The design choices, for example, create a very specific context that does not include every important feature of internal audit practice. These features could affect the way in which IAs assess the likelihood of management opportunism. Nonetheless, my setting captures the essential characteristics of both a hypothetical (continuous auditing) and traditional (periodic auditing) IA setting that allows me to examine the effect of IA assurance on the likelihood of earnings manipulation. In addition, this design allows me specifically to examine and add to prior research that examines the effect of IAs' dual role on assurance quality. I acknowledge that this is a complex manipulation that likely impacts internal auditors' objectivity. Additional institutional features, however, may be unlikely to change the results of this study.
My study presents at least two avenues for future research. First, my study examines a oneperiod setting and is unable to examine whether, as indicated by Coderre et al. (2005) 
Likelihood of Earnings Management
Separate Roles Combined Roles I would not report) or 1 (Yes, I would report); Org_ID = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant is above the median (11.75) and zero otherwise; Certified = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has at least one certification (e.g., CPA, CIA); EA_Experience = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has prior external audit experience; all other variables are as previously defined. *z-statistics in parentheses and significance noted at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 levels. *Constant suppressed for ease of exposition but is significant in all models.
